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Abstract.
In this thesis I demonstrate how a notion of decentred
subjectivity better describes marginal subject positions than the
•

concept of unified subjectivity which depends on a discriminatory
binary conceptualisation. I identify the migrant position as an aporia
from which to deconstruct such concepts as unified subjectivity, as the
migrant refuses classification according to dichotomous structures.
use Derridean metaphors to show the falseness and unexamined
essentialism inherent in binary oppositions. I use a combination of
theorists, and especially Helime Cixous, to augment my primarily
Derridean reading of migrant subjectivity within the texts: The

Crocodile Fury by Beth Yahp and The Mule's Foal by Fotini
Epanomitis.
Cixous' model genders the decentred subject, and situates
subjectivity as a discursive process. This theory also helps account
for the notion of movement integral to migrant identity evident in the
texts' characters. I examine the importance of cultural effects on
migrant subjectivity and the vital role that a recognition of the past
plays for migrants, both in terms of identity construction and as a
stategy of resistance to the phallocentric and Eurocentric bias of the
dominant culture. Lastly, I look at the way the novels transcend
binary categorisation and present a more fluid, multiple way of viewing
the world. This ideal of a more equitable system for marginalised
people is the goal of my feminist and postcolonial project of

resistance.
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lotroduction.

That's the place to begin. (The Crocodile Fury, 1, 4, 7, 14)

Australians take pride in their reputation for egalitarianism.
Russell Ward (1958) and Graeme Turner (1986), for instance, have
pointed out that it is considered part of our national identity. But as
Ward and Turner add, the concept of a national character is a fiction.
The white, male larrikin figure does not take into account those who
don't fit this 'norm' - at /east the fifty per cent that are female, and then
the many men who do not fit this stereotype: the majority of
Australians, in fact.
Australian egalitarianism is also a myth. The dominant culture
-male, anglo-celt, and middle class, homogenises, deletes,
appropriates, exoticises and discriminates against those that do not fit
their categories. These marginalised people include Aborigines,
ethnic groups, the poor, and women. It is the working assumption of
this thesis that we must strive for equity for all people. To do this, we
must destabilise and destroy the old discriminatory systems, and
search for new approaches that are more equitable.
This thesis will consider and reject the concept of a unified
subjectivity that is central to the discriminatory system of the dominant
culture. This notion of a unified subjectivity relies on an assumption of
'Being' as self-present, irreducible and knowable to the individual. To
dismantle such notions, I offer a primarily Derridean reading of The

Crocodile Fury by Beth Yahp and The Mule's Foal by Fotini
Epanomitis as part of a feminist and postcolonial strategy of
resistance. Although I use the two novels to explore the issue of

j
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migrancy of both authc•rs and characters, my emphasis is on the
theorising of migrancy and its impact on an ideal of equity. I look at
the ways a migrant position may traverse the space between the poles
of binary oppositions - rendering such structures illogical, and
opening a place for transgression of binary oppositions, where more
agency may be possible for marginalised people.
In the first chapter I examine traditional binary thought and the
power differentials within such structures that privilege the sovereign
subject. I relate Jacques Derrida's model of the hymen to the space
the migrant inhabits, in order to argue that the migrant position can
destabilise binary oppositions. Derrida has used the trope of the
hymen to figure an 'undecidable' space. I use this trope to subvert the
traditional discourse of the sovereign subject. Both the hymen and
the migrant are 'undecidables', that is: uncategorisable in a
dichotomous system. For example, migrants in Australia are not the
Aboriginal native, and neither are they the Anglo-celt settler, thus they
do not fit the postcolonial native/ settler opposition. Instead, like the
figure of the hymen, the migrant traverses a range of possibilities in
the space of the middle ground, opening the potential for alternative
models of subjectivity.
In chapter two I establish such an alternative model of
subjectivity, which is fluid and in-motion. The theory I use is that of
Helime Cixous, but is complemented by other such theorists as Trinh,
Butler, Hall and Van Herk. This model proposes a decentred subject
which is always already gendered, and situates subjectivity as a
discursive process, that is, as a series of interactions between the self
and culture. The subject retains a certain amount of choice, or
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agency, within these interactions, and this is crucial for marginalised
people striving for equity. I then move from subjectivity in general to
that of the migrant. I argue, using the migrant characters of the
novels, that integral to migrant identity is the notion of movement.
This movement mirrors both the movement within subject formation,
and also the way the migrant position moves within and beyond binary
oppositions. The migrant postion traverses the space made up of the
many positions on a continuum between two poles that are in
themselves provisional and continually shifting.
In chapter three I focus more fully on the novels and the
importance of the past in the formation of migrant identity. I trace the
search for origins of the migrant characters to show that actively
engaging in remembering provides a point of resistance for such
migrants. This is because it forces 'otherness' to the attention of the
dominant culture that wishes to repress difference. Consequently, the
'other' becomes more familiar and thus less feared and stereotyped.
In chapter four I come back to Derrida, this time using
'differance', which like the hymen is an 'undecidable'. Differance
describes the play within the formative processes of the subjectivity of
the two migrant characters in the novels. Differance describes the
non-binary effect of the flows between self and other(s), and of how
subjectivity is formed in this space. I use Derrida's linguistic model of
a chain of supplements to help illustrate the multiple processes of
subject formation demonstrated by the two migrant characters in the
novels. Such a subjectivity defies dichotomous categorisation, and
therefore transgresses binary conceptualisation.
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Such transgressio,l is empowering and important to
emancipatory movements like feminism and postcolonialism which
attempt to break out of rigid and discriminatory structures and
representations. A Derridean approach might seem incompatible with
feminist and postcolonial approaches, whose principal concern is with
notions of agency and subjectivity. One such criticism comes from
Kathleen Barry, who argues against deconstruction as a male theory
ihat elides feminism and does not take into account mat,"rial
oppression (1996). However, I counter this criticism by n)t just relying
on Derrida, but instead using other theorists (in particular, Helene
Cixous) to construct my conception of subjectivity which does take
into account factors such as gender and material oppression.
I use Cixous' theory of subjectivity to augment Derrida's theory
because she both genders the decentred subject and situates it within
cultural experience. In Cixous' model, subjectivity is formed through a
series of identifications with those of similar identities, and at the
same time, a series of differences with which the person interacts.
'Meaningful' 'subjectivity'' is created (rather than found) in the play
between identity and difference. Critics such as Sneja Gunew argue
that the decentred subject has always been a condition of
marginalised groups such as women and non-Western people (1992,

1These concepts in Derrida's work, along with others such as 'being', 'is', 'truth', as
well as 'difference' and 'trace', are sous rature or 'under erasure' as Spivak
translates it, in an attempt to avoid masterMwords. Spivak notes that erasure was
first used by Heidegger who wrote 'Being' with a cross through it (Of Grammatology,
xv-xvi) Derrida, however, has modified the 'concept' of erasure to indicate that 'the
presence of a transcendental signified is effaced while still remaining legible. Is ...
destroyed while making visible the very idea of the sign' (ibid, p23). Spivak notes
that the 'gesture or so us rature implies "both this and that" as well as "neither this
nor that" (fn, p320). Simply erasing the word is not the answer- we cannot 'unthink'
such structures without first thinking them.

•
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37). If the white Western male is also subject to this sense of
dislocation, then it seems to me that already there is greater equity, as
everyone starts off in a similar position.
Like Derrida's privileging of writing over speech in Of

Grammatology, which reverses the privilege that our philosophical
tradition has always granted to speech, I will privilege marginalised
groups in a play of difference between margin and centre. This
reversal acts as a first step towards redressing the imbalance of
power, and leaves a space at the centre for new speaking positions
which may be filled (provisionally) by marginalised people.
The unequal power relations that we must redress arise from
the oppositional binary thinking that sees people in terms of 'self and
'other', and the subsequent fear of that other. Derrida points out that
Absolute fear would then be the first
encounter of the other as other : as other
than I and as other than itself. (1976, 277)
Discrimination is thus based on a fear and misrecognition of the other.
Familiarity may lessen discrimination, but we must be careful not to
appropriate or exoticise marginalised groups, as Sau-ling C. Wong
says of American multiculturalism: 'the "culture" oi a minority is
typically commodified and promoted for consumption much like ethnic
cuisine' (1994, 83). George Papaellinas agrees, noting that migrant
texts are often praised on the basis of the write(s 'ethnic' origins
rather than textual content (1992, 166)'. A careful balance must
instead be negotiated in the space between voice and silence, where

21n much the same way that the judges of the Miles Franklin award (1995) were
accused over Helen Darvllle-Demldenko's controversial The Hand That Signed The
Paper.
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dominant subjectivities must be silent for a while in order to hear (and
not speak for) marginalised groups. This would open up a place for
multiple voices and multiple subject positions.
This thesis strives for such a plural approach in the hope of a
more equitable society. It may be said that this sort of approach has
been proposed many times in some feminist and postcolonial
criticism3 My belief is that there is still a pressing need for continued
debate and re-examination of our own subject postilions. As Spivak
says, it is not a matter of dealing with the problem once, but it needs
to be continually maintained, like cleaning your teeth (1990, 41, also
105). This seems to me to be even more important as a swing of
right-wing values sweeps Western nations as we head towards the
twenty-first century. According to Elaine Showalter we typically
project our existential anxieties onto the end of the century, investing
it with greater symbolic and historical meaning•. As such,
conservatism and fear of the other increase, leading to an antiimmigration stance in Australia that seems to be gaining popularity, if
not media coverage. If we could staunch this flow, and work towards
a nation that recognises and values difference, perhaps in the future
we could legitimately take credit for an egalitarian Australian society.

leonnie Thornton-Dill (1983), Gillian Bottomley (1991), Sneja Gunew (1993),
Caroline Whitbeck (1983), Elizabeth Grosz (1994), Jean Martin (1991), and Linda

Hutcheon (1989), amongst others.
4Sexua/ Anarchy (1992, p2): 'In periods of cultural insecurity, when there are fears of
regression and degeneration, the longing for strict border controls around the
definition of gender, as well as race, class, and nationality, becomes especially
intense. If the different races can be kept In their places, if the various classes can
be held in their proper districts of the city, and if men and women can be fixed in
their separate spheres, many hope, apocalypse can be prevented and we can
preserve a comforting sense of identity and pennanence in the face of that
relentless specter of millennia! change' (p4).
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Chapter One.
'The Hymen Breaks: Penetrating the Essential Binary'.
There is a/ways a place in the back of one's heart or a corner of one's
house even for the things one fears most. (The Mule's Foal, 50)

A binary opposition consists of two terms that define each other
by opposition. It carries an ideological weight which may not at first
be apparent. In fact, the binary is a false opposition where one term
defines itself by the other - by what it is not- and homogenises
everything else into the second category. This second category is
then denigrated, while the first term is valorised. According to
Derrida, the Western philosophic tradition is based on a metaphysics
of presence, always desiring a presence which is always already
absent. Hence, the first term of a binary is valorised because it is
perceived as a site of 'self, or presence, and the second term is
devalued as the opposite: absence, or the 'other'. In Of
Gramrnatology, Derrida claims that our philosophic tradition is

logocentric- that it locates presence in the word - and phonocentric
because it (wrongly) perceives speech as fully present and thus
privileges speech over writing. He argues that the
subordination of the trace to the full
presence summed up in the logos, the
humbling of writing beneath a speech
dreaming its plenitude, such are the
gestures required by an onto-theology
determining the archeological and
eschatological meaning of being as
presence. (1976, 71 )

I
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Derrida suggests that our philosophic tradition sets up presence as
necessary to determine the transcendental signified 'being'; that
'being' is determined as consciousness being fully present to the
subject. This tradition rests on an assumption that the spoken word is
'closer' to inner •~eech because the subject both speaks and hears
himself speak at the same time, and is therefore closer to 'being'.
The power hierarchy that lies within each binary opposition,
stemming from a desire for and privileging of presence, makes it a
dangerous structure. Binary thinking marginalises certain people, for
example, man/ woman, or coloniser/ colonised. In each example, the
first term is perceived as superior to the second. For instance, men
take the subject position and objectify women, and likewise, the
colonisers take the subject position and objectify the colonised. Thus
the sovereign subject recognises and valorises itself as white,
Western .md male, while it marginalises all its 'others'.
In The Other h'eading, Derrida notes the phallocentric and
Eurocentric bias of the sovereign subject. After much play on the
words 'cap' and 'heading', he uses Valery's description and definition
of Europe as a cape, or headland (20), as a site from which to
deconstruct this bias:
Europe has also confused its image, its
face, its figure and its very place, its
taking-place, with that of an advanced
point, the point of a phallus if you will, and
thus, once again, with a heading for world
civilization or human culture in general.
(1992, 24)
Through the chain of signifiers; Europe, point. phallus, and culture,
the first terms in a series of binaries, the white Western male

•
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continues to equate himself with the present of presence ('its tllking
place'), and the self-presence of consciousness and subjectivity
('heading for world civilization'). The second term -the 'other' that is
denigrated and feared - is absent from this conceptualisation.
Because binary thinking marginalises women and nonWesterners, both feminist and postcolonial theorists have been
interested in deconstructing such structures. In the case of feminist
theory, Cixous, like Derrida, has shown that the first term is valorised
in such binaries as active/ passive, culture/ nature, and mind/ body,
and that all of them equate with the master binary man/ woman
(1986). Woman is equated with the second terms: passive, nature,
and body, the opposite and 'inferior' of man, and is eventLJally elided
by the father/ son couple. Man (subject) defines himself by what
Woman (object) is not. Likewise, postcolonial theorists such as
Edward Said (1985) have shown that binaries such as Occident/
Orient or West/ East also valorise the first term in a relationship of
power. The second term is perceived as inferior, and systems of
oppression are perpetuated. Thus through binary thinking, the
marginalisation of women and non-Westerners becomes entrenched
in our very language and ideology.
Because the nature of hegemony is that we are unable to stand
outside it, that it is implicit in our language and thought, it often
remains unrecognised and unquestioned. We are all constructed
through hegemonic structures, so that the oppressed, as well as the
oppressor absorbs and internalises the idea that the oppressed is
different and therefore inferior. It is therefore important for

•
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emancipatory discourses to question the way ideology and power
work in an attempt to redress such imbalances.
Michel Foucault uses Bentham's Panopticon as an analogy to
illustrate how power works automatically in society. It is a regulatory
mechanism where the viewer can see but not be seen, the effect
being that even with nobody in the control tower, the prisoners will
regulate their own behaviour, having thus internalised hierarchies of
power and regulation (1977, 85-6). This conception of power is
explicitly represented in The Crocodile Fury. The novel represents
the working of colonial power through the way the rich man runs his
house, 'by division and an iron rule' (108). The Malaysian servants
are kept in fear of the rich man's reprisals, each section of the
domestic staff encouraged to be suspicious of each other, and to
report only to him. Thus, the rich man's house ran smoothly:
like clockwork, each part oiled by his
favour, and kept separate, gliding against
each other in their separate duties, aware
yet ignorant of each other, always
suspicious; rubbing shoulders but never
merging, coverting favour only for their
separate parts, never the whole. This way
the rich man kept tabs on everyone. Even
in his absence he ran a tight ship. (ibid)
Like the Panopticon, the rich man keeps his colonised subjects
separate and power hierarchies internalised, thus reducing the risk of
an organised resistance to colonial power. His house is a metonym
for the way a colonial society works to perpetuate unequal power
relations that benefit such sovereign subjects as himself.
As the novel demonstrates then, it is necessary to deconstruct
such structures as binaries if we are to achieve equality for

15

marginalised peoples. To do this, it is necessary to work from within
to dismantle oppressive structures, to refashion existing tools to suit
the purposes - not because we have a choice, but because, as
Derrida has argued, 'we can pronounce not a single destructive
proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic,
and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest'
(1987, 125). That is, we cannot step outside of language, and must
therefore use language to deconstruct ideology-laden language
structures such as binary oppositions.
Power imbalances in binary structures depend upon
(unrecognised) essentialist assumptions. The sovereign subject
defines itself as white, Western, heterosexual and male. Inherent in
this construction is an unconscious (and need I add, false) essentialist
assumption that whiteness and maleness equate with superiority. The
other is constructed by the sovereign subject as essentially different
and inferior to the self. The middle ground of such binaries is
excluded because the sovereign subject needs a great divide to
maintain its identity. This middle ground is often shifted to the
second, devalued side, where it (they) are forced into strict
stereotypes which limit the agency of marginalised people, such as
migrant women.
Although essentialism is unconsciously used by the dominant
culture as an alibi to oppress the 'other', it may still be a useful
strategy for emancipatory groups in a 'scrupulously visible political
interest' (Spivak, 'Strategy, Identity, Writing', 45). It must, however, be
ssoth Jacques Oerrida (Of Grammatology) and Pierre Macherey (A Theory of
Uterary Prpductlon) have usbd Levi-Strauss' idea of 'bricolage', where tools are not
made but borrowed, and can never be free of Ideology.
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acknowledged as a constructed category which is· only perceived as
essentialism, and that where one draws the slash between
essentialism and construction is arbitrary and always shifting
depending on context. The famous quotation by Simone de Beauvoir,
'[o]ne is not born, but rather becomes, a woman' (1976, 295),
suggests the construction inherent in the essentialist concept of
'Woman'. Essentialism and construction are not discrete categories,
but instead there is a continual interplay between the two, where
boundaries are often blurred or transgressed.
Essentialism has been defended as a useful strategy of
celebration for 'othered peoples', particularly by Black Americans such
as bell hooks. She says that Black women use essentialism as a
means of self-segregation to try to prevent being 'eaten'
(appropriated) by whites (1992). For hooks, essentialism is necessary
politically to emancipatory movements. For instance, a unified
assumption of the concept 'Woman' is needed for feminists to fight
against patriarchy. Thus, essentialist qualities can be used as a call
to solidarity and to celebrate difference from those that oppress.
Feminists engaged in the construction/ essentialism debate
may, however, be unknowingly serving the very phallocentric
structures they are trying to dismantle. Firstly, the debate may be a
strategy of 'divide and conquer' (Thornton-Dill, 1983, 136). While the
energy of feminists is being expended debating the issue of
essentialism versus construction, patriarchal oppression continues.
Secondly, the debate (being dichotomous) perpetuates the sovereign
subject's construction of a great divide between self and other, which
is maintained to privilege the sovereign subject. The other is then
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stereotyped into an essential category. Stereotypes, and the
'essentialism' inherent in them, are actually socially-defined and
maintained constructs. This becomes apparent when, for example,
not all women fit the stereotype of 'Woman'. The concept 'Woman'
assumes a universal essence common to all women. The arguments
of Black feminists against white feminists illustrate that there are no
(or few) common experiences among women, only differences6 The
concept of an essential 'Woman' is as marginalising when it is
expounded by women as when it is expounded by men.
Similarly, it may be dangerous for postcolonial people to
identify themselves with essentialism. As with women, essentialism is
premised on a universalism that seems incompatible with postcolonial
objectives. Essentialism makes racial stereotypes difficult to avoid.
There may seem little harm in stereotypes such as Blacks having
'natural' rhythm, for example, but this allows an opening for further
stereotypical labels, which limit or deny subjectivity. As Homi Bhabha
points out, essentialism is necessarily attributed to the colonised by
the colonial powers to preserve authority (1985, 154), and '[i]ts
discriminatory effects are visible in those split subjects of the racist
stereotype- the simian Negro, the effeminate Asiatic male- which
ambivalently fix identity as a fantasy of difference' (ibid, 150). This
brings us back to answering the 'threat of the other as other'. As
Derrida argues:
I can answer the threat of the other as
other (than I) only by transforming it into
another (than itself), through altering it in
6see, for Instance, bell hooks (1992). Also Busia and James {eds) Theorizing Black
Fem/nisms (1993).
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my imagination, my fear, or my desire.
(1976, 277)

l
•

The dominant culture alters, constructs and stereotypes the other until
it is as different as possible from the sovereign subject's own
(constructed) identity, and no longer a threat to that sense of identity.
Both novels clearly make use of a strategic, political
essentialism to disrupt such notions of a stable and unified
subjectivity. Each novel celebrates essentialist stereotypes, in
particular, by linking women to nature (at times)7 This is a strategic
use of stereotype that suggests the 'undecidability' of the migrant
position which oscillates between - both refusing and celebrating stereotypes. Difference, the other, which has been devalued
throughout Western history, is now privileged in a reversal of the
binary. From there, the characters traverse the space between each
pole of the binary - not stuck in a rigid stereotype, but simply visiting it
occasionally, thus transgressing the boundaries of structures of
oppression.
The figure I use for such transgression is Derrida's model of
the hymen. As Derrida argues in Dissemination, the hymen is both
inside and outside the body, both marriage and membrane, both
virginity and consumation simultaneously (1981). The use of this
model may seem counter-productive in a feminist project, for as
Gayatri Spivak cautions in 'Displacement and the Discourse of
Woman' the figure of the hymen doubly displaces woman as 'always.
operated by a calculated dissymmetry rather than a mere
contradiction or reconciliation' (1983, 172). She explains the

71 will discuss this further in chapter four.
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dissymmetry as inherent in the concept of marriage, which in Derrida
is the means of 'fulfilled identification' (ibid), and as male possession
and appropriation of the woman, is always already privileged over
virginity. However, I think the use of the hymen is justified in this case

•

for three reasons. Firstly, whereas the subject (Mallarme/ Derrida) in
Derrida's account is the male observer and perpetrator in the sexual
act that always already objectifies and appropriates the hymen (and
by extension, Woman), the subject in my account is female. Both the
characters and the authors of the novels are women. This means that
the distinction between subject and object is blurred, because the
hymen as object is also, as metonym for Woman, subject. This
blurring is a major function of the hymen, and it seems to me that this
function works fully only when the subject is female.
The second reason for using the model of the hymen is that it
points to a particular feminine biological specificity which is
appropriate to the female authors and characters within the texts I am
examining. I recognise that these first two reasons could just as
easily apply to other models such as Luce lrigaray's notion of fluidity.
lrigaray's model suggests the properties of fluids that have generally
been linked to the essential Woman, but lrigaray argues that these
are only some of the properties of fluids. She argues that a fluid also
mixes with bodies of a like state,
sometimes dilutes itself in them in an
almost homogenous manner, which makes
the distinction between the one and the
other problematical: and furthermore that it
is already diffuse "in itself," which
disconcerts any attempt at static
identification...
( 1985, 111 )

•
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Thus fluids perform the first function of the hymen, that is, blurring the
distinctions between self and other, which works to unsettle binary
constructions and the power differentials that such a
conceptualisation perpetuates.
I have, however, decided against using this model, and this
brings me to the third reason for using the model of the hymen.
Although both models have similar subversive qu:;~lilies, the hymen
suggests a barrier - something that must be broken. This fits better
conceptually than a model of fluidity, because the hymen as
membrane is reminiscent of the slash of the binary, which also must
be broken through to create a space for the excluded middle.
The hymen is the space between desire and fulfillment
(Derrida, 1981, 343-4), and as an analogy, it can serve to destabilize
binaries and fixed 'meaning'. It does this because it continually
negotiates the space of the slash or excluded middle of the binary. It
replaces the inadequacy of the slash(/) which, as a single symbol (is
it a coincidence that it so closely resembles the 'I' of the sovereign
subject?) suggests a third term, by homogenising all those that make
up the middle. The hymen represents all those points on the
continuum between the bipolar terms. That space is not rigid, but
moves and flows with contradiction and paradox. The hymen is
located beyond the binary, thus exposing the rigidity of binary
structures. As Derrida argues:
Thanks to the confusion and continuity of
the hymen, and not in spite of it, a (pure
and impure) difference inscribes itself
without any decidable poles, without any
independent, irreversible terms. (ibid, 210)

•
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Since each term of the binary is complicit in the other's meaning, and
thus in the exchange of difference between each term, the hymen is
undecidable and uncategorisable. It therefore presents a
transgression and an opportunity to deconstruct binaries.
Fotini Epanomitis and Beth Yahp, in their position as migrant
writers, act as 'hymen', unable to be categorised as either native or
settler, but are neither and both. This binary opposition, native/
settler, is particularly problematic. Migrants, such as the authors,
unsettle this binary by not fitting into either side of the 'slash'. As part
of a non-aboriginal settler tradition, they can be seen as coloniser.
However, that category does not fit them comfortably, because they
are not of the dominant anglo-celt culture generally associated with
the colonisation of Australia. Like Aborigines, migrants are often
excluded from the dominant culture, and can be perceived as
oppressed. However, that is not to assume that oppression is the
same for both groups. Migrants are neither the Aboriginal colonised,
nor the Anglo-celt coloniser. At the same time, as part of a Western
philosophical tradition, they are complicit as colonisers of Aboriginal
people, but are also subject to domination by Anglo-celt culture.
Thus, they are neither, and yet both, coloniser and colonised.
Migrants are also in a position to destabilise another related
binary opposition - ethnicity/ race. The terms of this binary, when
examined, reveal their underlying (and false) assumptions of
essentialism. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the
main difference seems to lie in the term 'race' referring to an
irreducible essentialism that is the result of bloodlines and ancestory,
whereas the emphasis of the term 'ethnicity' is more of similarity of
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culture (particularly religion) within a group. Ausiralian culture defines
'migrant' through an ethnicity lens, and 'Aborigine' through a race
lens. Both are defined in opposition to the dominant anglo-celt
culture. Both are at the bottom of hierarchies where the West is at the
top. The reasons for this oppression are twofold. Firstly, they are
othered by the dominant culture whose interests lie in keeping them
excluded as they fear a blurring of boundaries between them will lead
to a perceived loss of self and thus identity. The second reason for
the oppression is the material benefits to the dominant culture which
continues to exploit those they perceive as lesser than themselves.
Marie de Lepervance, in 'Race to Ethnicity', argues for the
shifting nature of the terminology within the opposition: race/ ethnicity.
She suggests that the constructed nature of these categories has a
material basis. She points out that the nineteenth century notion of
'race' served colonial interests well, and has become the more benign
(but still useful) term 'ethnicity'. The reason, she suggests, is that
racism, as such, is not profitable anymore. In Australia, a programme
of planned immigration was implemented to address the labour
shortage, and eventually these immigrants and their children were
numerous enough to affect elections (1980, 34). This is a reminder
that discrimination occurs on the level of class, as well as those of
gender, race, and ethnicity. Peter Li warns us not to conflate the
terms ethnicity and class, but also recognises that the effects of
discrimination can be similar (1988, 48). Otten ethnic groups are
constructed into certain (lower) classes, where the Eurocentric and
phallocentric systems of structure work to perpetuate their place
there.
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Thus, like the other binary constructions discussed, the
ethnicity/ race binary contains power differentials. It is another false
opposition, as both categories are constructed, and therefore needs
to be rejected. As Wilson argues, 'racial groups are distinguished by
socially selected physical traits, ethnic groups are distinguished by
socially selected cultural traits' (cited in Ethnic Inequality, 1988, 23).
In both cases, definition is dependent upon society- in this case, the
dominant anglo-celt culture. This is a society in which the term
'cultures' is generally perceived as separate and potentially clashing
entities, and is coupled with ethnicity through the development of
nationalisms (Bottomley, 1991, 304). Meaning, or identity, is
constructed by those of the dominant society, not by the actual
person, or group, in question. In other words, the dominant culture
objectifies on the basis of both race and ethnicity to retain its subject
position and stable identity, but may objectiiy differently according to
which category it is objectifying. The other, being objectified, is
silenced, and only granted a limited identity -that which fits in the
boundaries prescribed by the sovereign subject.
By questioning stereotypes and providing alternative subject
positions, migrants such as Fotini Epanomitis and Beth Yahp can
begin to redress the oppression that functions through binaries such
as self/ other. This self is white, Western and male, but I would argue
that the side of the other is constructed as a sliding scale with
privilege granted to those perceived as closer to the sovereign
subject. The self may define itself against a Greek, for instance, and
against an Aborigine another time. But if he is defi.ning himself
against both at once, then the Greek, although not anglo-celt, is
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shifted across to the self side - o~ at least nearer to the self, because
Greece is a Western nation.
Oppression is not simply one group dominating another, but
rather a series of vertical structures with white at the top and black at
the bottom, and other positions on the ladder dependent upon
degrees of colour or economic needs. On this ladder, a group may be
oppressed by a white Western male, but may also oppress those
'below' him in this vertical structure -a black woman, for instance.
Floya Anthias notes that colour is often a racial marker of difference of
the other, but it is a social construct, and not an essential difference.
When referring to the problem of shifting definitions, she remarks:
while Turks in London are 'white' they are
'black' in Germany. Some Cypriots are
darker than some Asians and yet they may
be regarded and regard themselves as a
white or European group. (1992, 14)
Here the signifier slides and seems to have lost all reference to the
sig~ified.

White may or may not be white, and black may or may not

be black- definition depends upon the perceiver and the context. In
terms of the authors, Greek-born Epanomitis would be perceived by
the dominant Anglo-celt culture to be less other than Malaysian-born
Yahp who remarks that Asians are always perceived as exotic: 'She
always comes from somewhere else, even when she's born in
Australia, even if she's a fourth-generation Australian' (1996, 65).
However, Yahp would be less 'othered' than an Aboriginal woman.
Because the slash between the polarised values self and other
shifts, definitions of pureiy self and purely other are difficult to justify.
According to Derrida, there is never an absolute signified - in the
place of the signified is always already another signifier. As in the
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above quotation from Anthias, 'Turk' seems to signify 'white', but when
the context shifts, it then signifies 'black'. Shifting definitions of the
signifier 'ethnicity' which were contexual and shaky in the first place,
are further subverted by patterns of migration and inter-breeding.
These people are even less likely to fit into a binary category. For
instance, is a Greek migrant like Fotini Epanomitis (who came to
Australia as a baby) Greek or Australian? Or both? Or neither? Is
Beth Yahp Malaysian or Chinese? Or is she Australian? These
questions are impossible to answer using a binary model because
each writer occupies a position beyond nationalistic binaries of settler/
native and the related self/ other binary of identity. If we think of both
women, using the metaphor of the hymen, we see they unsettle such
binary oppositions, traversing the space between each category sometimes resting at each poir.t, but mostly moving in a play of
differences where each nationality contributes to a series of identities.
In this way, both authors represent the migrant positions which resist
the sovereign subject's categorising and homogenising of its other.
The dominant culture constructs an other which is as different
from itself as possible, so that binary oppositions are maintained. In
racial terms, the dominant culture calls this constructed other the
'authentic' native. The more 'other' a writer is, the more they are
deemed to have the authority to speak as 'native' (Trinh, 1989, 88).
To fit this category, the 'native' writer must fit Western expectations of
the native, which are essentialist and nostalgic: a valorisation not of
the present-day aborigine, but of the prehistoric Aborigine (Stasiulis,
1993, p44). The self creates a discourse of the other as object; exotic
and stereotyped, without examining its own essentialist assumptions
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of superiority, and links with culture and progress. The dominant
culture's demand for authenticity only perpetuates binary structures
like settler/ native and self/ other, which serve the white, Western
male in two ways. Firstly, these binaries perpetuate existing
inequalities from which the sovereign subject benefits, and secondly,
they work to 'divide and conquer', thus keeping emancipatory groups
small and less powerful. As Trinh suggests, 'questions of authenticity
of others function as a diversionary tactic aimed at silencing those
who interrogate unequal social relations of powe~ (1 989, 88). But
when binaries like settler/ native crumble because of positions outside
those binaries- such as the ones Epanomitis and Yahp occupy
because they are migrants -then the concept of 'authentic native'
writing is also destabilised.
Migrants can thus counter existing inequalities by unsettling
binaries. This threatens the stable definition of the identity of the self,
as well as threatening the imposed definition of the other. The
migrant, as both foreign and Australian, challenges the opposition
self/ other, and provides a site for multiple tensions and meanings.
Meaning is created not with the antagonistic binary opposition, but
through the play of differences between a self-others relation. Fotini
Epanomitis and Beth Yahp provide a speaking position for
marginalised people by transgressing and unsettling the binaries self/
other and native/ oppressor. This transgression is continued through
the characters in their books, The Mule's Foal and The Crocodile Fury
which illustrate non-binary thinking and serve to give voice,
subjectivity and power to marginalised people.
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Chapter Two
'Imaginary Communities: Identity at the Juncture of Self and Othe~.
She was thrilled by the contrast in their bodies. Hers so white, so
smooth that it seemed to glow in the dark, and her child's so hairy and
black. (The Mule's Foal, 25)

It is important to establish a notion of subjecti~ity in relation to
marginalised people, whose identities have been either ignorea or
constructed in a limiting way by the dominant culture. The noti<?n of
subjectivity I use here is distilled from a number of postcolonial and
feminist theorists including Trinh, Hall, and Van Herk, but is mostly
based on the work of Heleme Cixous. In this model, subjectivity is
fluid, continually moving, and open to change. It is a very different
model from that of the unified subject which depends on
discriminatory binary conceptualisation.
I use Cixous' theory to augment Derrida's theory of the
decentred subject as its specific focus on external effects and gender'
allows the possibility of agency. Cixous argues that subjectivity is
often confused with individualism ('stupid, egotistic, restrictive,
exclusive behaviour which excludes the other'). She posits instead a
subjectivity that is 'the wealth we have in common and, by definition,
the subject is a non-closed mix of selfls and others' (1994, xvii). Thus
the self and other coexist in a mutually enabling pleasure.

80errida, in his foreword to The H~l~ne Cixous Reader, recognises the importance
of Cixous' work on sexual difference. He suggests that '[l]here is no asexual, asexed or meta-sexed reading of sexual difference because it is at once read and
reading' (x). Derrida thus notes that sexual difference Is always read by a gendered
subject 'it is always a she or a he who reads it' (Ibid).

28

Cixous argues that categories of masculine and feminine are
'economies' of behaviour, which do not necessarily equate to
biological categories of male and female. She argues that women
have greater access to pleasure because of the 'cultural and political
division of !he sexes' (ibid, 135), that because of this societal sexual
division, it is 'much easier to inflect on men than women the horror of
the inside' (ibid). This horror of the inside is the horror of the hymen,
which to men is a barrier that either must be maintained, or be
penetrated, broken, and destroyed by them in order to possess. For
women, the inside is a place of potential, a place of positive relations
where the self and other mix without fear. As Cixous says:
After all women do all virtually or in fact
have an experience of the inside, an
experience of the capacity for other, an
experience of non-negative change
brought about by the other, of positive
receptivity. (ibid)
Thus Cixous locates feminine subjectivity in the maternal', stressing it
as a positive experience. The interuterine self/ other relation where
the two interact without animosity, instead co-existing in difference,
can translate to an external self/ other(s) relation. This kind of internal
subjectivity where the boundaries between self and other are blurred,
makes women more receptive than men to the relations between the
self and an exterior other. Again, boundaries are blurred, so that the
line between self and culture-as-other continually shifts.

9Uchtenberg-EHinger also posits an interuterine theory of subjectivity, a model for
'processes of change and exchange, of relations without relating, in which the non-/
is a partner-in-difference 1994, 41). This model theorlses the development of girls
and the role of the mother which Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis ignores.
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Subjectivity is not a state, but an activity where the self
interacts with the other. Trinh describes such a notion of subjectivity
in a similar way to that of Cixous:
Not One, not two either. "I" is, therefore,
not a unified subject, a fixed identity, or
that solid mass covered with layers of
superficialities one has gradually to peel
off before one can see its true face.
(1989, 94)
That is, there is no essence of a subject, instead, the subject is made
up of discursive effects that inscribe their ideology onto us. As Trinh
goes on to say, "'I" is, itself, infinite layers' (ibid). These infinite layers
- a conglomeration of identities and differences - are a cacophony of
different voices. According to Cixous, each person has a
'spokesperson I' which is a solid social identity that emerges from the
cacophony to represent that person (1994, xvii-xviii). Subjectivity is
thus in constant motion as the individual responds with their various
internal layers to a variety of external effects. In 'Extreme Fidelity',
Cixous discusses the influences that shape us in different ways. She
argues that we can never escape from our 'individual and collective
history' or the 'cultural schema', and that
the individual negotiates with these
schema, with these data, adapts to them
and reproduces them, or else gets around
them, overcomes them, goes beyond them,
gets through them (135).
Interaction and negotiation are the keys to this type of fluid
subjectivity, and although subjectivity may be shaped by cultural
ideologies, there are still various possibilities, potential choices, that
are open to the subject, that enable her to 'adapt', 'get around',
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'overcome', 'go beyond'. In other words, Cixous argues that the
subject can transgress ideological structures, at least to some degree.
On this point, Judith Butler agrees, arguing that discourse and culture
constitute subjectivity, but do not necessarily determine agency, or the
specific way a person will act (cited in Seyla Benhabib, 1994, 82).
This notion of subjectivity which is gendered, fluid, infinitely
layered, in-process, and is formed at the juncture of self and other,
obviously does not fit the stereotypes which the dominant culture
thrusts on its other. 'Othering' occurs in a system that firstly, assumes
subjectivity to be unified and essential, and secondly, in a society that
thinks only in dichotomy. Thus, it is necessary to question and reject
binary structures and notions of unified subjectivity, and, as I have
argued, the migrant subject position is well placed to do this.
Migrant subjectivity is, of course, dependent upon a notion of
movement, and so the concept of movement within subject formation
is particularly appropriate here. I have therefore focused upon this
property of motion in my usage of the term 'subject-in-process' 10 as
shorthand to describe my concept of subjectivity. The term indicates
a continual living and interacting with life. 'In-process' suggests the
movement inherent in subjectivity. 'To say "I am not what I was"
locates identity on the move' {Gilmore, 1994, 238) The subject can
never be 'finished' or whole. This concept is important for
emancipatory groups for two reasons: firstly, if the sovereign subject
is no longer unified, but decentred like everybody else, then there is
no logic to support his privilege. Secondly, the more subject positions
!01 am aware that this is a term used by Kristeva, but I use it not (as she does) to
describe a kind of internal, psychoanalytic split betwf.!en II me, but instead as the
movement between the 'self and an external, cultural 'other'.
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that migrant women can inhabit, the more 'slippery' she is to define
according to stereotypes. Consequently, migrant women would be
less able to be controlled and objectified, and harder to categorise as
other.
Migrant identity is formed at junctures -the juncture between
(at least two) cultures, places, and times. As such, it can never be
stable and unified. Trinh suggests that identity lies at the intersection
of 'dwelling and travelling and is a claim of continuity within
discontinuity (and vice versa)' (1994, 14). Migrant identity is both
comforting - as a continuous identification with the past culture, and
disruptive - as a discontinuity within the sameness of the dominant
culture.
Migrant identity can never be stable as the relations between
the migrant self and the culture-as-other are always changing. Stuart
Hall argues that migrant identity lies at the juncture between the
personal and the cultural, at the 'unstable point where the
"unspeakable" stories of subjectivity meet the narratives of history, of
a culture' (1987, 45). Thus, like Cixous, Hall argues that individual
identity resides in the interaction between the self and the material
conditions of culture, is unstable, and continually in-process.
According to Hall, this dialogue between subjectivity and culture takes
place in "'imaginary communities" [that] are not a bit the less real
because they are 11lso symbolic' (ibid). Displacement, exile, loss, as
well as positive experiences of creation and imagination are both
symbolic and real aspects of the migrant subject position.
Aritha Van Herk, a Dutch migrant to Canada, takes up the point
of the positive aspect of migrancy, suggesting that the migrant

•
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position offers an opportunity to re-write the self: '[t]o write the
immigrant self is to engage in an active fiction, however physical and
representative, to fiction a present and a future out of a self-censored
past' (1991, 187). Thus the migrant, upon entry to a new culture, may
create new identities. This is the point where I think the migrant
subject position can be read positively, for the migrant can become
the agent of her own creation. Often the migrant point of entry is
perceived in negative terms because of its sense of loss,
displacement and exile. Take, for example, Sarup's discussion of
strangers (and all migrants are strangers, at least at first):
Strangers often seem to be suspended in
the empty space between a tradition which
they have already left and the mode of life
which stubbonly denies them the right of
entry. (1994, 101, emphasis mine)
Here the migrant experience is seen as a loss of the past and a
refusal of the future, leaving no possibilities in an 'empty space'. My
argument is that although there are undeniably negative aspects of
migrancy, there are also positive ones where strong, empowered
identities can be forged. This is where the 'undecidable' qualities of
the migrant experience threaten to irrupt and destabilise the
assumptions of the dominant culture.
Fotini Epanomitis also suggests the positive aspect of migrant
experience:
The migrant experience of dislocation,
however, holds out the possibility of
belonging to more than one place at the
same time and having more than one
identity. And though this can be stressful
when the different cultural identities come
into conflict, it can also lead to a better
understanding of both cultures. (1994, 3)
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The emphasis here is on the migrant experience of straddling two
cultures as a positive experience - a place of multiple identities and
possibilities. A plural, positive sense of self results when people are
not limited to stereotypes. Furthermore, it is harder to oppress a
moving object on the hierarchical ladder; harder still to constrain a
moving subject. A refusal to accept simplistic binary categorisation
allows for different voices, and helps redress power imbalances.
As I've suggested above, the migrant position enables the
subject to imagine and create new selves. She has control over which
new self she chooses to be her 'spokesperson I' - an act of agency
that transgresses those codes of the dominant culture which seek to
restrict the other to an easily identifiable stereotype, and keep in place
the strict binary opposition of self and other. Thus, the creation of a
fictional self can be an empowering act of resistance for the migrant
woman.
The concept of subjectivity in-process can be liberating to
migrant women because it destabilises the limiting notion of unified
subjectivity. In each novel is a key character which can be read as a
paradigm for this sort of resistant migrant subjectivity. Both the
characters of the lover and Meta are shown to be tirelessly moving
between positions, resisting stereotypes, and thus transgressing
oppressive binary conceptualisations. As Beth Yahp says about her
work, 'in my stories the Other Asia [stereotypes of Asi~n Woman] can
play seductress, or victim, or oppressed migrant, or schoolgirl swot,
but she has to promise me one thing. Never to be just that' (1996, 7071 ). Instead of being restricted to stereotypes, these migrant
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characters traverse the 'uncontrollabls', roaming the ambiguous
middle ground of binaries.
The lover in The Crocodile Fury is an 'undecidable'. Instead of
the antagonistic 'either/ or' of binary oppositions, she has a 'both/ and'
relation to them. For instance, as a captured ghost, she is both alive
and dead. She is both fish and human; both man and woman. She
represents both jungle and sea. Yet she is also neither of these
things. When she appears at the narrator's illness, Grandmother
'smelt salt and the open sea, then a cloudy smell of dark places, of
jungle mud'. Her hand is 'like snatching burnt sticks', but is also 'as
cold as ice' (87). She is a conglomeration of attributes that are
usually in opposition. She is multi-faceted, and strong: unable to be
stereotyped into a simplistic, limiting identity. Thus, she is
transgressive. The rich man, who represents phallocentric and
Eurocentric colonialism, cannot hold or oppress her. The
undecidability of her position; her 'otherness' threatens to irrupt and
overflow with excess.
Meta, in The Mule's Foal is also an 'undecidable'. She is the
'other' -the migrant; the stranger; the woman - in a culture based on
binary structures. She belongs to more than one culture, and more
than one language. 'Home' to the stranger or the migrant means more
than one place. But that is not to say that there are just two homes,
two cultures and two languages. Rather, each is a series of shifting
points that exposes the illogic of such dual structures of thought.
Meta is, at first, a stranger, and strangers are, in principle
unclassifiable:
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A stranger is someone who refuses to
remain confined to the 'far away' land or go
away from our own. S/he is physically
close while remaining culturally remote.
(Sarup, 1994, 101-2)
Strangers, like migrants, refuse to be bound by a rigid spatial model
like that of binary structures, and instead can be both 'close' and
'remote'. Like migrants, the stranger blurs boundaries, and 'is an
anomaly, standing between the inside and the outside, order and
chaos, friend and enemy' (ibid). Therefore, the stranger and the
migrant are 'undecidables' because they are uncategorisable
according to a dominant culture that thinks only in dichotomy. They
both blur boundaries anc! provide a point of resistance against an
oppressive dominant culture.
In The Mule's Foal, transgression of binary structures
illustrates, and is a result of, the subject-in-process. Meta further
blurs the boundaries between categories of familiar/ stranger by not
remaining a stranger when confronting the Priest, but instead
oscillating between the two. She was: 'so familiar that the villagers
were at the point of calling out his name, but then he changed again.
And he was a total stranger to them' (p41 ). In this scene, Meta
transgresses several other binary categories -young/ old, child/ adult,
animal/ human. Her laughter begins like that of a child, and then
becomes a song sung by someone very old. She changes from Greek
to Turk, and appears to change into a goat as she skips away.
Finally, her gender also changes:
The Blind Traveller moved towards the
Priest and as he spoke his physical person
changed before their very eyes. This
change did not just happen once, it was
happening continuously. Just by lightly
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tilting his head, the old man's lips became
full and his eyes softened so that the
villagers could have sworn that they were
actually looking at a woman. But then he
would move his face up towards the sun
and he was a man again, and at this point
there was a defiance in his body which was
certainly over one hundred years old.
(40, my emphasis)
This passage perfectly illustrates the movement of play within a
conception of subjectivity in-process. A one-off change from man to
woman (or vice-versa) would keep the binary opposition in place and
with it, a unitary sense of subjectivity. But the continuous change
represents the play of differences, as both absence and presence (as
well as varying degrees of absence and presence) make their bid for
the centre, but are constantly deferred. The concept of subject-inprocess is inextricably bound up with a notion of experience. As
Cixous argues, subjectivity is made up of a series of 'simultaneously
single and collective often brutal experiences' (1994, xv), that for
women may include the birth and loss of children, and in the migrant
instance would include displacement, exile and loss. Experiencereal or imagined - is ongoing rather than simply accumulative. As
Gilmore argues, experience 'connotes a profoundly political,
emotional, intellectual, and imaginative response, a series of
alterations, differences, and repositionings in relation to sameness'
(1994, 238). A person does not just gain a sense of subjectivity
<hrough one experience, but through the constantly changing series of
experiences, large and small, that makes up their life. In the novels,
migrant subjectivity is shown to be rich and complax as e result of
abundant, momentous experiences. Both the lover and Meta undergo
a dramatic series of alterations, differences and repositionings,
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~xperiencing

life in a bombardment of sensory, intellectual and

spiritual responses.
Subject formation, then, relies on a series of experiences, both
individual and collective. Integral to the specific migrant subject-inprocess is the negotiation of the experience of the past within the
present. The past is crucial for migrant subjectivity, and I will focus on
this in the next chapter. I will also argue that remembering the past
can be a strategy of resistance against the oppression of the
dominant culture.
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Chapter Three.
'The Presence of the Past: In Search of Migrant Origins.'

The dark cracks and crevices of the swallowed past snaked out to
snag her. (The Crocodile Fury, 274)

As migrant characters, the lover in The Crocodile Fury and
Meta in The Mule's Foal, must negotiate a space between two
separate sets of cultural experience; the old and the new. They are
located beyond those cultures, in a constructed culture that is
completely their own, being as it is made up of multiple interactions
specific to the individual's own background. As migrants they cannot
be 'either/ or' -their identity is not fully realised if they are one or the
other. As Sneja Gunew points out, 'diasporic cultures are quite
different from the culture that they came from originally' (interview
question to Gayatri Spivak in The Post-Colonial Critic, 64). The
migrant culture is in interaction between old and new cultures, as Beth
Yahp in 'Place Perfect and the Other Asia' reflects:
We straddle two countries and cultures,
and maybe even more: this harbour
reminds us of another harbour or the lack
of it, a certain odd way of expressing
something leaks into our language to make
people from both before and after stare.
(68; my emphasis)
There can be no purely 'before' the date of arrival in Australia, neither
can there be a purely 'aile~. Rather, the interplay between cultures is
mutual and oscillating, both seeking the presence of the now, but both
always already relegated to a past, an absence, that refuses to stay
put- that leaks out. This indicates a subject-in-process that consists
of a set of experiences that shift and change, and memories that are
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re-translated and re-inscribed in the light of subsequent experiences.
To deny the past is to deny part of the process of migrant subjectivity.
Therefore, the search for one's origins is an important part of
subjectivity for migrant women. Pure self-presence is unattainable,
but always desired by the subject. Migrants must negotiate with a
notion of their past, even though origin is just another signifier, which
becomes a function, rather than a fixed point in space and time. As
Derrida argues, origin is a 'function, indispensable but situated,
inscribed, within the system of signification inaugurated by the
interdict' (1976, 266). For migrants, therefore, it is not the teleological
'discovery' of a point of origin that is important, but rather the process
of searching because it keeps the past with its subversive, disruptive
potential active. Migrants must acknowledge and accept the old
culture, their past, if they are to legitimate their sense of identity,
because as Brewster notes, it is their past which the dominant culture
wishes to repress (1995, 15).
The books themselves may be a search for origins for the
authors. Certainly the characters are seeking to find where they fit
into history and culture in order to find their own identity. Each small
section in the firsi chapter of The Crocodile Fury starts with 'That's the
place to begin' (1, 4, 7, 13), and the phrase is interspersed a little less
frequently throughout the rest of the book. It historically and culturally
grounds the story, but at the same time, indicates the impossibility of
locating presence in a concept of origin -there is always already
another signifier; always the trace of another 'place to begin'. The
search for origins is important, too, in The Mule's Foal. Stella says
'that all men are from one town and sooner or later they return to that

I
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town' (131)- a recognition that origins cannot be ignored. Both
passages indicate that it is necessary for the migrant to come to terms
with her past as it may be a position of strength for the migrant, and
may have the potential to disrupt the ideology of the oppressor, which
wishes not to acknowledge difference.
The lover and Meta are forced migrants, and are both victims of
the dominant culture's desire for the exotic. They are exoticized while
their past remains unacknowledged by their husbands so that they
can be kept as a possession through marriage. We are told in The

Crocodile Fury that the rich man collects exotica, that
nothing pleased him more than to lie on
one of his luxurious couches, holding an
invaluable object, a latest acquisition, in
the palm of his hand. (5)
The lover becomes his 'latest acquisition'. She is described like an
object of art, beautiful, but lifeless as (an exotic) stone: 'A tear from
her was a diamond, a smile like the rarest jade' (143). So when the
rich man captures the lover and brings her home, she is seen by him
as just another piece of exotica.
In The Mule's Foal, Meta, who 'kept a clove of garlic under her
tongue to sweeten her breath' (15), is also seen as exotic. Being a
Turk in Greece, she is desirable to the men of the town because she
is the other:
And the more pious and righteous the men
claimed to be, and the louder they cursed
the Turkish beast, the greater was their
desire. (In fact, Mirella's house had a
scandalous cure for impotence. The
whores would enter the be~ chamber
having rubbed garlic oil between their
legs.) (16-7)
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It is Meta's desirability, her sexuality, that threatens her husband,
Stephanos. She is neither, and yet both, the traditional stereotypes of
whore/ madonna, and as such, he doesn't know how to treat her.
From a phallocentric tradition that thinks only in dichotomy, he faces
the confusion of the hymen. As a product of his tradition he doesn't
understand the 'logic' of the hymen, which is paradoxical and unable
to be categorised. As such, his identity as a sovereign subject is
threatened, and so Stephanos reacts with fear and hostility when
faced with the strength of the other. Thus, he betrays her; having her
imprisoned, in an action that reproduces the eliding of the other by a
dominant culture that wishes to repress such disturbing difference.
To resist being 'othered', the lover and Meta must construct
their past through a search for origins. The lover's search for her
origins is represented by the search for the scale and knife that were
taken from her at the point of her capture. The rich man kept the
lover's scale and knife, the only things linking her to her past. Thus
the rich man denies the lover the aspect of her subjectivity which is
formed by the memories and experiences of her past culture:
the lover was like glass to Grandmother,
reflecting only its image, its one layer. She
looked and looked but there was nothing
underneath. (197)
It appears that the lover has no subjectivity: 'nothing underneath',
instead she is only an object to be admired, an 'image'. Later,
however, Grandmother discovers the scale and knife, which are the
key to the lover's identity. They signify her past- her link to the sea and were taken from her at the moment she was taken from her
culture. The rich man, a representative of the dominant culture,
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effaces her past and culture which are represented by the scale and
knife. They are the repository of the various layers of her subjectivity:
From the scale and the knife the lover's
smell came sh£ ·p and unrelenting. On
them the shadows she could not see when
she looked at the lover were layered soft
and thick. (199)
The scale and knife are a reminder that her past (although elided) is
all still there as a formative part of her subjectivity, as well as in her
memories, ready to rise up and disrupt the dominant culture.
Refusing to forget her past as the dominant culture wishes,
Meta integrates her two nationalities, Greek and Turkish, through
family. She marries Stephanos, who is Greek. Yiorgios the ape-face,
her grandson, is the result of the Greek- Turk union and is symbolic
of its richness. It is only while he is alive that the village flourishes.
His household is fertile: the chickens lay twice a day, the ewes are
milked three times a day, and the sterile mule has a foal. It is the
integration of the two cultures that brings prosperity, life and equity to
the village. Meta, however, chooses not to live with her Greek
descendents, but instead lives at the whorehouse \<ith her fellow
women Turks, Mirella and Agape, to celebrate and validate her
origins.
Memory is crucial in the search for origins, in the process of
legitimating both the self and the old culture. The search for origins is
conducted through memory, both collective and individual. Memory is
a means of striving for presence, both in itself and as a perceived
path to the subject's origin. As Derrida argues, 'a limitless memory
would in any event be not memory but infinite self-presence' (1982,
109). Memory is finite and changeable. An example of this is
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Grandmother in The Crocodile Fury, who constantly re-evaluates her
past experiences in light of subsequent experiences, thus
retranscribing her past. Grandmother fictionalises herself, which, as I
argued in the last chapter, is an act of creation and transgression of
oppressive powers - in this case, colonialism.
Memory is explored through oral stories and gossip. The
books themselves are structured like a series of oral stories. Oral
stories are shown to be rich, lively and changing, rather than the
rigidity of traditional Western narrative patterns with their emphasis on
problematic concepts of 'truth' and 'unity'. Within this narrative
tradition, Derrida associates a link between the concept of time in
terms of 'spatial movement or of the now' and a linearisation of writing
and speech (1981, 72). This linearity reveals itself in the importance
of the concepts of arche and telos inherent in Western thinking: 'it is
always in the figure of the Western heading and of the final headland
or point that Europe determ;nes and cultivates itself (1992, 25,
emphasis in original). Europe seeks its identity in a solipsist
positioning of itself as "the beginning and end (and therefore as
meaning) of Being/ everything. Consequently, the focus of Western
narrative patterns is on one story and on one version of events;
effectively effacing the other and other possible versions.
These Western narrative patterns are represented in The
Crocodile Fury by the storytelling that the nuns teach. The bully does
not understand the linearity of Western stories, despite how often the
nuns tell her that stories 'must' have a beginning, middle and an end.
These stories have a message, a moral, which dictates to the reader
exactly what to think or how to behave. Grandmother's oral stories,
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on the other hand, weave and repeat and change, but leave the
listener to come to her own conclusions. As Trinh points out, clear
and direct language is perceived by Westerners as correct and
persuasive, but this concept of storytelling renders most Eastern
writing incomprehensible:
The language of Taoism and Zen, for
example, which is perfectly accessible but
rife with paradox does not qualify as "clear"
(paradox is "illogical" and "nonsensical" to
many Westerners), for its intent lies
outside the realm of persuasion.
(1989, 16)
Persuasion and instruction are properties of Western narrative
patterns, and may be inappropriate to non-Westerners. This is made
clear in The Crocodile Fury where the bully can't tell the difference
between history and storytelling, because the history she is made to
learn is that of foreign places and their royalty and wars. To her,
Western history is fictional - it bears no resemblance to her lived
experience. Thus, colonialism enforces inappropriate Western ideas
on to the other. The nuns make the girls chant:
A stitch in time saves nine. As red as
cherries, as white as snow. Take care of
the pennies and the pounds will take care
of themselves. One bad apple spoils the
whole barrel. (17)
These make no sense to Grandmcther because words like 'snow',
'pound' and 'apple' have no meaning outside of their European
context. As such, Western instruction effaces the other and other
versions which may be equally (or more) valid than the Western one.
In The Mule's Foal, writing functions as a way of remembering
and keeping intact the culture of the 'other'. It is a means to resist the
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colonialism of the League of Good Men who are led by a 'pale
millionaire' (88). The League of Good Men initiate the 'Days of
Progress' (Humanist Enlightenment}, thrusting their inappropriate
Western values and concepts of 'progress' on the village. The village
suffers as a result, for in these 'Days of Progress', although there was
a doctor and a school, 'there was never enough food' (94).
Stephanos resists such colonialism by documenting in his 'histories'
the history of the village so that their culture is not forgotten and
elided by colonial appropriation.
In both novels, the written word is portrayed as only one of
many truths, suggesting that there is not just one truth, neither is there

no truth,

but rather, many versions dependent upon the position of the

subject. The lizard boy in The Crocodile Fury sorts through piles of
paper, attributing each with arbitary truth values thE! change with
each sorting. He has ingested Western 'othering' of his culture to the
extent that he attributes 'truth' only to pieces of Western origin:
'This one's printed overseas, must be true
story. This one local, aiya, can't even spell
properly, so many mistakes! Can't be true.'
(84)
The lizard boy is here making a temporary play for a perceived centre
by filling the place of a Westerner and taking on Western values.
These are such that great importance is placed en truth, meaning,
form, logocentrism, and linearity - in short, presence.
The lizard boy, who doesn't believe anything unless it is
written, is asked by the narrator's mother if he remembers the night of
the ghostchasing, as he was, after all, ihere:
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'No,' said the Lizard Boy, whose greatest
asset was his capacity for forgetting. The
Lizard Boy tapped his head. 'No memory,
no evidence inside here. No proof. You
make your head go blank, then you can't
be hurt. Then no more ache. (226)
Acknowledging one's origins can be painful and dangerous. As Aritha
van Herk suggests, 'forgetfulness is shell shock, a strategy for
unendurable wa~ (1992, 167). In the case of the lizard boy, the
unendurable war is colonialism. However, forgetting painful
experiences denies a vital part of the person's identity, which, as I
have argued, has meaning only within the play of present and past,
desire and (forever deferred) fulfilment. To regain their sense of
subjectivity, the collective and personal memory that is available to
migrants through an oral tradition must be utilised. Memory is a
legitimation of the self, and such a self resists othering by the
dominant culture.
Like memory, naming is evidence and validation of existence.
The bully in particular, is concerned with collecting 'evidence'
because:
She says the nuns are going to kill her. To
bury her in the jungle and rub out her name
so no one will know. The bully takes
pictures for evidence. (14)
She rightly fears Western oppression and denial of the native culture,
subjectivity and existence. 'Countermemories' are one way of
preventing such appropriation. Gillian Bottomley cites Lipsitz, who
argues that 'count.,rmemory acts within the limits of historical time
while retaining and celebrating the divergent and even oppositional

•
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practices of monumental time"' (1991, 314). As such, countermemory
is not restricted to the realm of Western notions of time as linear and
teleological, and may be a means of subverting such limited and
limiting notions of time. Th"J, countermemories can form 'a base for
resistance and a space defined across difference' (ibid). Memory
therefore becomes an important means of validating and keeping
alive the culture of the oppressed during and after colonialism. It is
the part of migrant subjectivity (because it is of the past· that
unknown and uncontrollable 'other' time) that most threatens the
dominant culture. The dominant culture therefore represses and
effaces a migrant past too threatening for it to acknowledge.
Stephanos in The Mule's Foal gives his grandson Yiorgos his
'inheritance'· a countermemory of that which the dominant culture
wishes to repress: a mass grave of his people slaughtered by the
League of Good Men. They are forgotten; nameless, like the
Aboriginal and immigrant victims of violence that mainstream
Australian culture represses with 'socially organised amnesia'
(Brewster, 1995, 15). Stephanos ensures the continuation of
resistance to colonialism when he gives his son the histories he wrote
which documents the names of those slaughtered. As Trinh argues,
'naming is part of the human rituals of incorporation, and the unnamed
remains less human than the inhuman or subhuman' (1989, p54).
The naming of the slaughtered is therefore part of the countermemory
process which personalises the violation that the dominant culture
tries to depersonalise and repress. Stephanos' act of subversion

11'Monumental time' Is a term taken from Kristeva's 'Women's Time' (1986), and
refers to time which is all-encompassing, Infinite, eternal and cosmic.
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triggers the leaving of the Colonialists. Thus naming is a call to
solidarity with which to resist cultural oppression.
Naming is not just an indicator of collective, cultural identity,
but is also an indicator of personal identity. When Meta is imprisoned
in a nearby town, she turns into a man:

No one knows who he is. There is no
name and no record of his crime. So he is
set free. (p81)
Without a name she has no female subjectivity, and because her
'crime' was that of being a powerful woman -of being an other who
refused to be 'othered' -there can be no crime if she is no longer
exactly the other. As a man, she is invisible, the norm, no longer
noticed and no longer a threat. So she is set free. Meta has been
shown to traverse the binary man/ woman, and used namelessness
for her own purposes. She is a character with choice and some sense
of agency.
Memory preserves culture, and prevents the past from being
repressed and effaced by the dominant culture. The native culture is
remembered through stories and gossip that situate the characters in
a social and historical cultural context. The novels lament the demise
of memory: forgetfulness is equated with the Joss of traditional culture.
The grandmother in The Crocodile Fury is obsessed with telling the
narrator and the bully stories of the past. It becomes more and more
important to have them recorded as she gets older and her memory
becomes weaker. Her stories are a countermemory which validates
her existence, and that of her culture.
Forgetfulness, on the other hand, means that the old culture
dies, and with it, identity, both collective and individual. In The Mule's
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Foal, Mirella laments the sadness and gloom of the village brought
about by people forgetting their past and their culture: '[t]his is the

village of amnesiacs, whereas once it was the village of gossips' (4).
Gossip and words are associated with remembering, with happiness
and richness of life. When Yiorgos, both man and gorilla, dies, the
village begins to lose its liveliness and prosperity:
Without the songs, the kafeneio of Yiorgos
the Apeface became a sad and lonely sort
of place. People did not talk about him.
People forgot about him, people were not
interested in talking about anything any
more. (146)
Here, sadness, lack of talk and forgetfulness are explicitly linked. The
villagers begin to forget their cultural heritage. Without their past,
they lack the vitality and richness that they had when the past and
present were integrated.
In both novels, it is grandmothers that tell the story, although
both are childless, rendering the label 'grandmother' technically
incorrect. More apt would be the title 'wisewomen', which is used by
the grandmother in The Crocodile Fury to describe herself. Although
it is the fourteen year old granddaughter who narrates Crocodile, in
fact, she tells her grandmother's story (or stories). This is
acknowledged by the framing of the book. Before the first chapter is
the epigram: 'This is a story my grandmother tells'. The suggestion is
that it is only one story of many, instead of the definitive one which
would be suggested by the definite article. The effect of this, as well
as the framing which attributes the story to the grandmother, is to
deflect responsibility for reliability away from the narrator, thus
problematising the concepts of narratorial truth and relilability. The
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problem with such concepts is that they rest on assumptions by the
dominant culture of exactly what narratorial truth and reliability are,
thereby excluding any other versions.
The framing of the novels has a similar effect to the one
Derrida attributes to the preface:
The pre of the preface makes the future
present, represents it, draws it closer,
breathes it in, and in going ahead of it puts
it ahead. The pre reduces the future to the
form of manifest presence. (1981, 7)
By situating the main body of the works in a 'now', and thereby
investing them with a (false) presence, what is said by the texts has
the illusion of being more authoritative and authentic. Thus they are
more likely to be better received by the dominant culture" and have
more influence.
The narrative framing within the novels has important
implications for 'authenticity'. If presence is traditionally located in the
spoken word, then autobiographical writing (as the 'next best thing' to
speech) is more 'true', according to our phonocentric tradition (Gunew
1985, 148, also 1989, 111 ). However, as Sneja Gunew cautions, 'the
use of the first-person mode is no guarantee of anything but that a
convention has been mobilised' (1983, 17). Nevertheless,
autobiographical writing often gives the illusion of authenticity.
Migrant writing (and women's writing before it) has been constricted

12Both novels have won awards. The Crocodile Fury has won the Victorian
Premier's Literary Awards, Sheaffer Pen Prize for first fiction (1993) and the NSW
Literary Awards, Ethnic Affairs Commission Award (1993). The Mule's Foal has won
the Australian/ Vogel National Literary Award (for an unpublished Manuscript)
(1992), the Commonwealth Writers' Prize, South-East Asia and South Pacific
Region, Best First Book Award (1994), and the Victorian Premier's Literary Awards,
Sheaffer Pen Plize for First Fiction (1994).
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by the dominant culture as 'confessional' writing in order to be
'authentic' (a category, as I have argued, constructed by the dominant
culture to keep the other distinct from the self, and therefore inferior).
The narrator in each of the novels is consciously objectified as a
character, and this draws attention to the flctionality of the story, and
its (as well as her) multiple meanings. A unified concept of 'truth' and
of subjectivity is questioned and found lacking.
The books open up a space where individual difference is
allowed free play, in the process, deconstructing the traditional
concept of 'identity'. The women characters are inextricably linked
with women's experiences -which colour their lives and their way of
seeing: 'she gave herself back to the world, and the waters broke and
colour ran through everything' (The Mule's Foal, 131 ). The feminine
is linked to fertility -juxtaposed with the above quotation is: 'The
harvest was remarkable' -to nature and to cycles. But the women are
not confined to such traditional roles. The grandmother and Mirella,
although childless, are nonetheless rich and complex characters.
They each adopt a daughter and live in unconventional, man less, but
successful families. Michele Barrett has pointed out the oppression of
the family and the social construction of categories of 'good' and 'bad'
motherhood. The disapproval that accompanies unmarried
motherhood 'relates precisely to a socially constructed category of
femininity and maternal responsibility' (1988, 71) The grandmother
and Mirella, as unmarried mothers, have subverted traditional
categorisation. The adoption of Agape by Mirella, and the narrato~s
mother by the grandmother further subvert such constructed
categories by gaining daughlers, and thus a matrilineal descendency,
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without the use of men at all. Instead of being defined as wife or
daughter or mother as women traditionally are, their identities are inprocess and built up slowly, of the many experiences that make them
what they are, and what they will be, thereby transgressing the
sovereign subject's oppressive structures, and providing a possible
point of resistance.
Thus, the search for origins is a demonstrably crucial means of
retaining a sense of past for migrants, whose past may otherwise be
effaced by the dominant culture. This sense of past is in turn crucial
for the formation of migrant subjectivity. Such a subjectivity provides
a position of resistance to the oppressive culture because it is forced
to acknowledge the feared other. This acknowledgement is the first
step to dismantling oppressive power structures and creating a more
equitable system for marginalised people.
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Chapter Four.
'Neither One nor Two: The In-between Space of Migrant Subjectivity'.

Then there was Meta, neither man nor woman, and her grandson both
man and animal. How was one to know anything in a world like this?
(The Mule's Foal, p143)

Derrida's notion of 'difference' can be used to describe the play
within subjectivity that enables migrants to transgress the conceptual
model of the unified subject. Like the hymen, difference refers to the
space or blank where absence and presence interact in a play of
difference. As such, it suggests the 'undecidable' or uncontrollable
within the novels' migrant characters: that which doesn't fit into binary
structures and stereotypes. Difference is a Derridean neologism from
the french root ditterer, and incorporates both the spatial (to differ),
and temporal (to defer) aspects of this play of differences (1968, 112).
As a homophone of the word 'difference' -the 'a'

impercepti~le

to the

hearer, but not to the reader, it has the effect of temporarily reversing
the phonocentric privileging of speech. For, according to Derrida,
Western culture privileges the spoken over the written in a binary
opposition. This kind of reversal of binary structures is also evident in
the novels, where the other- woman, animal, stranger, migrant- is
temporarily privileged over the self.
Derrida writes that difference is the 'non-full, non-simple,
structured and differentiating origin of difference' (ibid, 115) - yet it is
not an origin. It is not transcendent, and excercises no authority. 'It is
not announced by any capital letter' (ibid, 123). It is conceived in
negative terms so that it is not thought of as the master concept,
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which it constantly subverts. Yet it is not necessarily negative in itself,
as it is the effect of the play of differences which allows more
speaking positions. In the case of the novels, difference suggests a
way the characters may escape (sometimes) the dominant culture's
oppressive binary structures. The characters do this by traversing the
space in the binary that is represented by the slash, thus changing the
function of the slash from one of antagonistic barrier, to a space of
relation. This allows the characters more 'room to move', and
therefore the possibility of more agency in their lives (albeit still with
some constraints) than they would have within the stereotypical
constructions made by a culture that continually others them.
There are three main devices in the novels where I note the
effect of difference: firstly, objects that link people and events that
would otherwise be seen in opposition; secondly, 'in-between' times
and cycles that fit into neither side of a binary, and are generally
connected to the feminine; and thirdly, characters that fluctuate
between both sides of the binary opposition in a play of absence and
presence. These three categories demonstrate a degree of
movement within migrant subjectivity. This motion threatens the
dominant culture by being unclassifiable according to dichotomous
structures. Therefore, migrant subjectivity may be subversive and
transgressive of dominant ideology.
The first linking object is the knife in The Crocodile Fury which
materialises a symbolic link between the characters and, I will argue,
prevents a simplistic 'us and them' binary. The knife is initially taken
from the lover by the rich man in his colonial and patriarchal
appropriation of her as an exotic object. The knife is then taken by
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the grandmother, then by the narra:. ~s mother who gives it to the
lizard boy, who gives it to the priest who in turn gives it to the bully. It
is an object that links what would otherwise be in opposition - not to
unify those oppositions, bulla link them in interaction. Like a chain of
signification, each character is both separate and linked to the next.
Each character in turn supplants/ supplements the last as the keeper
of the knife. The grandmother becomes the lover and the rich man;
the lover supplants the old man and becomes a bandit; the narrator
becomes the lover, finding rough, scaly patches on her skin, as well
as the lover's footprints attached to her feet. This supplanting
threatens the sovereign subject by problematising fixed identity, which
is why Derrida (borrowing from Rousseau) refers to the supplement as
dangerous. This notion of supplement both adds and substitutes
itself, but is always seen as exterior. Derrida argues that
'metaphysics consists of excluding non-presence by determining the
supplement as simple exteriority, pure addition or pure absence'
(1976, 167 emphasis in original). The dominant culture, which relies
on a 'metaphysics of presence', perceives a second threat when the
supplement reveals that 'presence' is actually absent, for if presence
was fully present, there would be no need or room for a supplement.
The supplement therefore dislodges notions of presence and identity
as fixed and stable. Thus the supplement is a valuable tool or effect
for the marginalised because it subverts traditional Humanist notions
of the unified subject which form the basis of its oppressive systems of
thought.
In The Crocodile Fury, the knife is a supplement to an absence
in each person, adding a dimension of freedom and power to those
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people. For instance, the Malaysian lizard boy is tethered by the
Western nuns in chains symbolic of colonialism, to prevent the
disruptiveness of his otherness from leaking out and 'contaminating'
others. To break free of his physical and symbolic bonds and becomd
the rebel bandit, 'King Crocodile', he needs a supplement- the love
and trust of the narrator's mother, here represented by the knife she
gives him which cuts the chain. At the same time as it adds a
dimension of power, the knife also

bond~

each character to the owner

of the knife -the lover. The lover's subjectivity is signified by the
scale and the knife, hence her constant desire for tile knife which,
when she finally gets it on the second last page, turns out to be just
another signifier. Presence does not come with the knife -the
essence of the lover still eludes her, and the closest she can get to it
is by supplanting other 'beings': the rich man, the old man, the
narrator, the bully, the crocodile. Her presence is never still- an
endless chain of signifiers that deludes itself by thinking her origin
and telos lie in the sea.
The knife as a supplementary link draws attention to the
specific relationships be~Neen Grandmother, the lover and the rich
man, and the play of difference between them. Instead of a simple
opposition between the rich man and the grandmother (as
representatives of the West/ East binary), human elements of jealousy
and other emotions make the relationship more complex. But most
importantly, the knife highlights an ambiguity in the binary - a place
from which to deconstruct that binary -that is, the position of the lover
who is both oppressed and oppressor. As a woman she is oppressed
by the rich man, but as a Westerner, is also complicit in the
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oppression of the grandmother. However, oppression can go both
ways - Grandmother holds the key to deferring the love~s desire by
witholding the knife. The lover is an 'undecidable', representing the
ambiguous figure of the white woman in postcolonial politics and
discourse, both oppressor and oppressed. The slash in the binary
(which is no longer a slash but a gaping space -as I argued in
chapter one: a hymen) is shifting, dependent upon context.
The bones in The Mule's Foal also perform this linking function,
signifying an essential race memory: 'Vaia's sadness came well
before her lifetime. Vaia's sadness was the old sadness' (26). This
race memory is exclusively available to women. The bones which
symbolise this memory are those of Stella's parents who died in the
'blond-pissing epidemic' (26-7), and are passed matrilineally from
Stella to her daughter Vaia. They not only link the women to each
other, but also to a feminine history and a traditionally female
domestic sphere of weaving, collecting berries and singing: 'She
would sing at the top of her voice as if the past and the future were
hers' (28). This is repeated twice more over the next two pages, until
Vaia (the second one) is imprisoned and raped and comes t.o a
realisation:
Locked up for five days without food, she
came to understand that time is not as she
had always imagined it to be. She lost
sight of the past, of her mother the saint.
She lost sight of the future, of her father
the Eminent Citizen. She thought only of
the woman who turned into a bear. So that
is how it was. At any present moment one
was a woman scrubbing wool by the river,
with a woman's thoughts and a woman's
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past and a woman's future. The next
moment one was a bear. (32)
When confronted with the reality of her lived experience as a woman,
of the unequal power relations between men and women, she comes
to realise her own lack of presence -that the present is never present,
that 'now' is simply a signifier defined against other 'not-news'. She
loses sight of masculine time -that which is linear and teleological and instead falls into what Kristeva calls 'women's time', which is on
the one hand localised and cyclical, 'cycles, gestation, the eternal
recurrence of a biological rhythm which conforms to that of nature and
imposes a temporality whose stereotyping may shock' (1986, 191 ),
and on the other, all-encompassing and what Kristeva calls
'monumental'. It is in the junction of cyclical and monumental time
'experienced as extra-subjective time, cosmic time' (ibid), that the
subject may experience 'vertiginous visions and unnameable
jouissance' (ibid). These visions and jouissance are the times in the
novels when the migrant women have the potential for transgressing
the constraining structures of the dominant culture.
The second device - in-between times and cycles -also
destabilise binaries, thus questioning the dominant culture's
oppressive a·;sumplions. These times are important junctions where
the order of things are disturbed, and life-changing, 'extra-subjective'
events occur. In The Crocodile Fury, these junctions coincide
explicitly with women's cycles:
AI seven months a baby girl gets her first
teeth which she loses when she is seven
years old. At2 x 7 years = 14the yin path
opens, that is, the onset of menstruation.
AI 7 x 7 years = 49 menopause ensues.
(188)
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It is between the first two cycles, at age seven, that the narrator
suffers her life-threatening illness, and the grandmother wheedles
another cycle from the spirits. However, it is at the end of the second
cycle, when the character is 'no longer a child, not yet a young
woman, at the in-between time given to general bouts of dizziness
and reeling' (11) that so many important things happen. This
'women's time' -at the beginning of menstruation - is important
because it is a specifically feminine physiological event that works as
a symbol of the psychological gateway or boundary between child and
adulthood. Grandmothe~s extra eye, for instance, opened with the
onset of menstruation. This extra eye that opens and closes at
important points in the narrative is in a sense an awakening and a
reawakening as Grandmother is given the privileged gift of 'sight'
(being able to see the 'other world'). Menstruation signifies the entry,
or symbolic birth, into womanhood. If, as Derrida says, 'the
determination of origin always has the form of presence. Birth is the
birth (of) presence' (1976, 309), and rebirth, or reawakening is 'the
plenitude of presence returning to itself (ibid, 310), then one could
read Grandmother as achieving moments of full presence. However,
Grandmother as absence is emphasised by the conneGtion of these
times to very specific feminine biological events such as menstruation,
which is the point at which women may be seen to be most different,
or other, from men. This paradox of woman as both absence and
presence is the site of difference where presence and absence are
engaged in play, where moments of transgression can occur and the
centre may be provisionally filled by the margin.
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All the female characters in The Crocodile Fury experience
something like Kristeva's notion of 'extra-subjective' events at this
age, the beginning of menstruation. The bully grew until age fourteen
and then stopped. The events at" the story culminate, and are told at
the end of the narrato~s second cycle. This is the vulnerable time,
when the character can no longer draw on the 'innocence' of
childhood, but does not yet have the resources of adulthood on which
to draw. Paradoxically, it can also represent a time of strength for
women because it is unable to be neatly categorised into a binarythe character is neither and both child and adult. II is at the time when
the women are most defined as absent (when they are at the
strongest marker of womanhood), that they paradoxically come
closest to presence.
Similarly, an in-between time in The Mule's Foal, is in 'that
strange world that is neither of the sleeping world nor of the waking'
(19) where Meta is trapped and imprisoned. It is in this vulnerable inbetween time that she can be tricked. Normally, she is too clever and
powerful. To render her powerless, Stephanos lets loose a black
rooster upon her, thus transporting Meta back to her childhood when
she had been terrified by a rooster 'ravishing' her. After her
imprisonment and subsequent rapings, Meta comes back to the
village even more powerful than before.
Like The Crocodile Fury, The Mule's Foal connects time and
nature to the female body, perhaps, as Kristeva suggests, inscribing
women with an essentialism13- with a 'stereotyping [that] may shock',
but this link is both celebrated and spotlighted as a different, less
13See my discussion in chapter one on the strategic use of essentialism.
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linear way of measuring not just domestic events, but historical ones
as well. As Gayatri Spivak notes in 'Explanation and Culture:
Marginalia', categories of private and public can be not just reversed,
but displaced, because, 'if the fabric of the so-called public sector is
woven of the so-called private, the definition of the private is marked
by a public potential, since it is the weave, or texture, of public activity'
(1988, 103). In both novels, private, public and political spheres are
interwoven so that women are present in all of them. The women are
involved in the political resistance against Western colonialism - the
lover becomes a rebel bandit; Meta and Mirella arrange for the deaths
of the League of Good Men. In The Mule's Foal, this is a particularly
feminine resistance - the League of Good Men die as a result of the
services of Agape in the brothel. (The name 'Agape' suggests that in
effect, they die of love.) Because the lover and Meta are involved in
the traditionally male sphere of the political, they occupy strong
subject positions outside of female stereotypes, and oscillate between
each position of stereotype and non-stereotype.
The third device used to thwart binary oppositions are
characters that inhabit both sides of the binary. In each book, there
are numerous and central examples of the difference of characters:
both male and female, or both animal and human. At the same time,
they are neither male nor female, neither animal nor human. In The

Crocodile Fury, the lover is both human and fish, reminiscent of a
mermaid. The crocodile of the title is both a man and a crocodile, and
also symbolic of each character's worst enemy, and therefore, its
meaning is contextual. Meaning is created differently by each
character in the movement along a chain of signifiers. The
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grandmothe~s

crocodile is hungry, and represents the promise she

made to the lover. The bully's crocodile, on the other hand, is always
full, and represents her envy of the power and privilege that goes with
colonial capitalism. The nuns' crocodile, is 'everything outside the
convent' (57),- which often means the Malaysian 'othe~. but always
means anything that may potentially corrupt their theological beliefs,
particularly about sex: 'Crocodiles are attracted by the smells of girls
with their legs apart' (186). The meaning of the signifier 'crocodile' is
contextual and dependent upon the perceiver. Likewise, Meta, in The
Mule's Foal, is both man and woman and human and goat, Yiorgous is

both rr.an and gorilla, and yet at times he is simply described as 'hairy,
but in a manly, handsome sort of a way' (117). 'Meaning' thus
traverses the the middle ground of the binary, unstable, transgressive,
and defying categorisation.
The categories man/ woman and human/ animal may seem
mutually exclusive to those of us brought up in the humanist tradition
which relies on binary thought. After all, there is no way to mistake a
human for an animal, is there? But in this age of genetics where 99%
of ape genes have been found to be the same as human ones, the
difference between animals and humans is less and less clear. As I
argued in the first chapter, such 'essentialisf categories as man/
woman and human/ animal are socially constructed, and the slash
between them arbitrary. Although the novels sometimes use a
strategic, liberating essentialism, they also point to the way society
constructs an oppressive essentialism. For instance, in The Crocodile
Fury, the lizard boy declares:
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They think they got a crocodile, fine! They
got one. They think they got a human,
they got one. All depends what they think.
(246)

The lizard boy's idenitity is dependent upon how others construct him
into one of the two categories. Gillian Bottomley discusses this in
terms of homogenising terms such as 'community', suggesting that the
term may cover 'people with some shared values, but the status of
these imagined communities often rests most firmly in the
homogenizing intentions of the obsetVet (1991, 311, my emphasis).
The lizard boy's identity is shifting and dependent upon the position of
the people who perceive him -the priest who helps him escape (but is
consequently considered a little senile by the nuns), and the nuns
who see him as a disturbance, a disruption, as 'other'.
Likewise, in The Mule's Foal, after Meta is imprisoned, she is
constructed by Stephanos, her husband, as being able to 'transform
herself into any animal she wished'. Her son believed that 'he had
been suckled by a goat with fourteen nipples' (21 ). Notice that in both
books, the subject that perceives is male, and in The Crocodile Fury,
he is also Western. So the Malaysian boy and the woman are
othered into (constructed) essential categories, so that the perceiver
can redefine his identity on the human and male and Western side of
the binary, further perpetuating unequal power relations.
While the novels illustrate how society categorises people into
binaries, they also question the bipolarity of these categories. They
suggest that the slash between the categories moves; that the
boundaries between them are blurred. The lizard boy's skin flakes
and he grows a tail. He is not just a man mistakenly perceived as a
crocodile, rather, he is both crocodile and human. From a distance,
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Meta looks like a goat to the villagers (42), and when she returns, the
first thing her son sees is 'her nipples pointing out from beneath her
red dress'. He doesn't recognise her because he is 'still waiting for
the goat with fourteen nipples' (83). The recurrent nipple imagery
associates Meta with motherhood, and therefore nature, and yet she
is not a 'natural' mother -one whose son would 'naturally' recognise
her; one who would (surely?) 'naturally' be more interested in
reuniting herself with her son than seeking vengeance on her
husband. She is both mother and not mother, woman and goat. The
categories of woman and animal are not discrete. The boundaries of
'3ach category can be transgressed by certain characters.
Transgression of boundaries gives those characters some
choice, and therefore, power. By power I mean not just social and
cultural value that is attributed to those that are 'successful' in the
public sphere, but also, and more importantly, a psychological and
emotional success that comes about with an integration and
acceptance of the other as part of the self, and acceptance of
difference. As Calle-Gruber states, '[s]trength does not come from
preservation (of the same) but from the irruption of alterity' (Afterword,

The Helene Cixous Reader, 1994, 218). Instead of being restricted to
the marginalisation that occurs with being stereotyped into one
category, these characters have access to more experiences, which
works to free their potential for agency. Even when the transgression
occurs between two marginalised categories, the character is still
empowered. This is because the undefinable; the unknowable is also
the uncontrollable. In The Crocodile Fury, the grandmother warns of
the land crocodile- a 'creature who can't be controlled'. He 'lives on
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the edges of the jungle so he gets the best of both worlds' (my
emphasis}. His body is 'hot but his knife is as cold as ice' (18). The
description of the land crocodile is made up of binaries, but rather
than being a series of descriptions from one side of the binary, the
crocodile moves between both categories, thus empowering him to
have the 'best of both worlds'. In The Mule's Foal, Meta is also
powerful:
At some point Stefanos had lost control of
her. She had grown and grown so that, it
seemed to him, his house could not
contain her any longer. (17}
She is uncontrollable because her sense of her own subjectivity has
'grown and grown', she has transgressed boundaries of human/
animal and man/ woman. She is more than a woman, and much more
than a stereotype. To go hunting, she would 'put on her husband's
black and grey striped breeches' (p16}, thus 'wearing the pants' both
literally and figuratively, as well as retaining some of those qualities
generally perceived as 'feminine'. The name 'Meta' is the clue to her
power and the reason for it, with its two-fold meaning: change or
alternation, and transcendence. Meta is able to alter her identity, and
go beyond the limits of being a woman and a Turk in a patriarchal and
Greek society. She is 'undecidable' and uncontrollable, and as such
is subversive. As I have argued, the uncontrollable, the undefinable,
the continually moving subject refuses to have a stereotype pinned to
it, thus offering the potential for greater agency and less 'othering' by
the conglomeration of sovereign subjects that make up the oppressive
dominant culture.

•
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Conclusion:

I will breathe slowly, carefully, into the spaces that are left. I will make
these spaces my own. (The Crocodile Fury, 313)

This thesis argues that, by their very nature, binary structures
inevitably oppress marginalised peoples. It argues that a notion of a
decentred subject is more equitable and empowering to the
disenfranchised. This kind of dismantling in favour of a more fluid
kind of subjectivity is, of course, a major goal of feminist and
postcolonial discourse and politics. However, feminist and
postcolonial theorists, are, like myself, not happy to leave the subject
completely decentred and floating aimlessly, with no autonomy or
agency, which would render political action impossible. Feminism and
postcolonial ism needs a theory that accounts for and allows political
action. A 'robust' theory grounded in historical, and material
specificity, rather than philosophy, as Fraser and Nicholson suggest
(1993, 428).
It is in chapter one that I showed how the migrant position
destabilises a series of binary structures through Derrida's model of
the hymen. I suggested that a binary conceptualisation is informed by
unacknowledged assumptions of essentialism which privileges the
dominant culture. Through the 'undecidability' of the migrant position,
I established the mobility of boundaries in order to make a political
argument about the possibility of resistance for marginalised people,
against the inadequate notion of a unified subjectivity. In chapter two,
I proposed an alternative model of subjectivity which can account for
the migrant position. This model is based largely on Cixous'
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gendering of the decentred subject which includes an account of the
external relations between self and other: between the self and its
culture, particularly in terms of the discursive effects upon migrant
.subjectivity. In chapter three, I examined, through the novels'
characters, the importance of a sense of past to migrants, as well as
the interaction between past and present cultures. The fourth chapter
demonstrated the way this migrant subjectivity works within the
novels, and how it can resist structures of power such as colonialism.
To describe the play of difference between self and other, I have here
used Derrida's notion of differance. This notion suggests the
continual negotiation at the site of the subject, thus constructing
identity.
Although this thesis uses The Crocodile Fury and The Mule's

Foal to explore the issue of migrancy of both the authors and the
characters, my emphasis has been on the theorising of migrancy, and
its impact on an ideal of equity. I believe theory needs to be used
politically, and therefore my thesis is weighted towards the theoretical
so that it may have a wider political applicability beyond the novels.
Hence, I have used the novels, The Crocodile Fury and The Mule's

Foal to demonstrate an alternative model of subjectivity to that of the
unified subject. However, I believe we cannot stop our resistance to
such power bases at the physical edges of the novels.
In reading the decentred subject in these novels, the migrant
woman would be left lost, floundering in an endless chain of signifiers.
Although Derrida shows us that we can't have full presence, or a
'complete' subjectivity, I don't think that should stop us searching for
one. An illusion, or sense of subjectivity is important for people to
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want to carry on living. Thus, I suggest that migrant women must be
placed at the centre at least provisionally, and then that more
equitable visiting rights be issued for all parties to visit the centre.
That is, a subject-in-process, where part of that process includes a
provisionally centred subjectivity.
I realise it may be said that I am part of the white, Western
culture that I am critiquing, but that is only part of my subject position.
I am also a woman, and as such, do not feel completely part of the
privileged dominant culture. Like the migrant position, like the lover in
The Crocodile Fury, I also am an 'undecidable' -the ambiguous figure
of white woman, both complicit in the oppression of non-Westerners,
and oppressed by my culture's phallocentrism. Always I am aware of
the problems of appropriation of the 'other', but I feel that this thesis is
part of the listening process. To arrest the eliding of marginalised
people, it is necessary not only for them to speak, but also for
someone to listen to thern: to speak with, and not for them. This
notion of conversation unsettles the dichotomous Western adversarial
system with its hierarchies of power.
A migrant position, with its 'undecidable' properties, disturbs
and disrupts the dominant culture's notion of a unified subjectivity,
thus changing our conceptual thinking from a binary model to one of
difference. As Kristeva says, 'We need multiple, plastic,
polymorphous, and polyphonic identifications' (1990, 173). We need
to be flexible, fluid, and open to different voices. We need to
recognise and celebrate difference instead of discriminating,
marginalising and fearing the other. This will create a more equitable
society as we move into the next millennium -one which will benefit
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us all as we learn new ways of seeing and experiencing life from
those who have previously been ignored.
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